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Introduction
The World Cup is one of the most prestigious sporting events globally. Its excitement,
drama, and cultural importance are watched and felt by millions of people around the world. 1
Nations unite every four years to watch their teams represent them in Earth's most popular and
commonly shared sport. Despite this phenomenon, the long-lasting cultural impact and the
infusion of politics within this shared experienced tend to be under-discussed. Although on the
surface level, it is just a sport, a country's performance in the World Cup and the actual
tournament itself can have lasting ramifications for everyone involved, ranging from those
playing to even everyone watching from a distance.
This impact of the sport is evident in previous tournaments throughout the years. This
said impact goes beyond solely the cultural importance of the sport itself. Like many other major
sporting events, such as the Olympics, the World Cup carries inherent political ties as well as
massive ramifications for such a tournament being played in a host country. For instance,
infamous sporting spectacles with ties to promoting political ideologies include the 1936
Olympics in Berlin hosted by Nazi Germany. 2 In addition to this shameful acceptance of
tournaments hosted in this manner, a different sporting event belongs in this category: the 1978
World Cup in Argentina. Despite its under-discussed nature, the 1978 World Cup belongs in this
crucial conversation because of the wielding of the tournament in order to promote a positive
political image of a reactionary, right-wing military-led government that had blatantly committed
human rights abuses years prior.

“More than Half the World Watched Record-Breaking 2018 World Cup,”
https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/2018russia/media-releases/more-than-half-theworld-watched-record-breaking-2018-world-cup.
2
Alan Tomlinson, and Christopher Young, National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture, Politics,
and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup, Albany: State University of New York Press,
2006, p, 1
1

Gore 3
For context, in Argentina, a right-wing military Junta seized power in 1976. This new
regime in power immediately reacted with swift and brutal political suppression. After taking
control, the Junta's leader Jorge Videla stated, "As many people as necessary must die in
Argentina so that the country will be safe again." 3 Videla made this promise into a brutal reality
for the years the Junta was in power. Thousands of leftist and unionist leaders went utterly
missing and even eventually killed at the hands of the Junta. Numerous reports came out of
Argentina depicting the horrors. Amnesty International (a human rights watch group) came out
with a report released in 1977 detailing the blatant human rights abuses. The said report details
precisely as such:
Amnesty International has received varying estimates - from priests, journalists,
lawyers, and political groups - of the number of people in Argentina who
disappeared or had been abducted over the last two and a half years. The
estimates range from 3,000 to 30,000, but the figure most frequently quoted is
about 15,000. The usual course of events, it appears, is for someone to be dragged
from his home at night by men who identify themselves as agents of the police or
the armed forces; when relatives proceed to make inquiries, by asking at the local
police stations or barracks, and perhaps eventually filing writs of habeas corpus,
they receive no information or help. The missing person has “disappeared.” 4
Not only does this report put into context the sheer size and scale of the crimes committed by the
regime, but it was only reported a few years into the regime's reign. This fact indicates that since
the regime stayed in power, these crimes only continued to escalate as the total number of those
who had disappeared far wanes the initial estimates "15,000" in the report. 5 Thus, a massive
outcry within Argentina, but not the rest of the international community as a whole, spoke out

“Argentina 1978 | a History of the World Cup,” YouTube, Tifo Football, June 21, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9mHlVJ1-5g&ab_channel=TifoFootball.
4
Amnesty International, “Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina 6-15 November
1976,” March 1977, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/204000/amr130831977eng.pdf, 27.
5
Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror, Rev, & updated, with a new epilogue, Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011, Preface, xi
3
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against these atrocities. Nevertheless, the regime continuously arrested many more Argentineans
despite this outcry. For instance, one group that came to prominence was the “Mothers of the
Disappeared.” This group consisted of mothers protesting in the central capital plaza in Buenos
Aries, demanding that their sons be returned to them or told about their whereabouts. 6 They
bravely protested every day in that same plaza, without a response from the Junta. Despite their
quite public resistance, the Junta still arrested many of the groups' leaders. 7In dark contrast to
their hopes, the regime kept torturing many of their sons in political concentration camps or even
executed them.
Another example of domestic resistance towards the regime in the beginning stages of
their seizure of power is Rodolfo Walsh’s open letter to the Junta. Walsh, a prominent journalist
within Argentina, protests the crimes of the regime in his open letter by stating, “Fifteen
thousand disappeared people, ten thousand prisoners, four thousand casualties, and tens of
thousands in exile: these are the raw numbers of this terror. Since ordinary jails were filled to the
brim, you created virtual concentration camps in the main garrisons of the country, which judges,
lawyers, journalists, and international observers are all forbidden to enter.” 8 Shortly after writing
this letter, the Junta murdered Walsh. Walsh's murder at the hands of the Junta was not an
anomaly, as other press members who spoke out in Argentina suffered a similar fate. 9 This
murder showed the Junta's consistent and systematic pattern of brutality in the lead-up and

Marta Moreira de Alconada Aramburu. Youtube. Video translated by Papelitos, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCCwQQdCtLg&ab_channel=KleostratodeT%C3%A9nedos
7
Jonathan, Wilson, Angels with Dirty Faces: The Footballing History of Argentina, London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 2017, 365-366.
8
Translated by Cedric, Belfrage, "Rodolfo Walsh's Last Open Letter," In these Times, January 11, 1978,
8, https://login.ezproxy-eres.up.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxyeres.up.edu/magazines/rodolfo-walshs-last-open-letter/docview/1962199366/se-2?accountid=14703.
9
B.L Smith, "The Argentinian Junta and the Press in the run-up to the 1978 World Cup," p 71
6
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during the World Cup. That is, they would go to any lengths to domestically punish anyone
speaking out against them in order to cleanse their image both at home and abroad.
However, years before the regime took power, FIFA, the main legislative body of
international soccer, 10 rewarded Argentina the highly coveted rights to host the World Cup.
Despite the blatant human rights abuses, FIFA visited the country and concluded it was still
acceptable to play with the Junta in power. As Archetti explains, the commercial opportunities
were more critical to FIFA than the crimes of the Junta. He states, "Neither FIFA nor Coca-Cola
engage in politics or take moral standpoints, putting the qualities of hosting countries at the core
of their concerns. The Junta knew very well that FIFA was not prepared to cancel the World Cup
on ethical grounds.” 11 As a result of FIFA's gross negligence and moral indifference, the
military Junta thus saw the World Cup as an opportunity to legitimize their political power to all
of Argentina and the rest of the world. Thus, the only proper way for the regime to legitimatize
itself after its military coup was for Argentina to win the most prestigious soccer tournament in
the world on Argentinian soil. The hope was to show the world that Argentina could host "a
tournament of peace" that showed an Argentina better off with the Junta in power than without it.
Jon Spurling succinctly explains the goal of the regime:
The Junta, led by…Videla was responsible for the illegal arrest, torture, and
murder of thousands of Argentines as part of the notorious 'Dirty War' waged
against opponents of the new regime. With the population living under such a
tyrannical cloud, Videla saw distinct advantages to be gained from hosting the
World Cup: the feelgood factor, he hoped, would unite Argentines under one flag,
raise the country's profile abroad and silence the dissenters at home. 12

The words “soccer” and “football” are used interchangeably. Although many of the British sources use
“football,” most Americans say “soccer” instead. Thus, when not used in a quote, this paper will use
“soccer.”
11
Alan, Tomlinson, and Christopher Young, National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture,
Politics, and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup, 136.
12
John, Spurling, Death or Glory: The Dark History of the World Cup, London: VSP, 2010, 96.
10
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Thus, with this aspect in mind, it is clear that from the beginning stages of planning the World
Cup, the regime had one goal in mind. Thus, only a complete victory from the team itself could
accomplish that aim. And accomplish that goal they did; Argentina defeated the Netherlands 3-1
in the final in Buenos Aires to claim the country's first-ever World Cup trophy.
However, with this victory came controversy concerning the human rights abuses and the
actual victory in itself. Thus, a tarnished legacy is associated with the 1978 tournament as a
whole. Additionally, in the lead-up to the tournament, a massive international boycott campaign
ensued, making the political corruption of the regime laid bare for the world to see. In addition,
the tournament matches themselves were heavily influenced and argued by some, fixed in favor
of Argentina due to the regime's meddling.
Despite its complicated legacy, the 1978 World Cup in Argentina has been conversely
remembered as both a tournament of controversy, corruption, and triumph. 13 Because of this, a
crucial re-examination of the topic becomes necessary. Thus, this paper argues three divisive and
significant points since the tournament ended. That is, although the tournament still took place, it
is clear that the international boycott was indeed more successful than it may have initially
appeared due to an increased awareness of the Junta's crimes. Additionally, this paper argues that
the tournament was won by Argentina in the face of influence by the Junta rather than solely
because of it. Third, despite the symbolic protests from the team, the memory of the event itself
will permanently be tarnished because their victory accomplished the goal initially set out by the
Junta.

13

John, Spurling, Death or Glory: The Dark History of the World Cup, 94-96.
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Section 1:
Although the tournament shone a light on the human rights abuses in Argentina, the
censorship of the press domestically and the resistance put up by FIFA, and the Junta towards
international protests created the opportunity for the dictatorship to host the tournament in the
first place successfully. Although the initial goals of the boycott did not lead to a clear
abandoning of the tournament, their later efforts and change in strategy brought never before
seen international attention to the human rights abuses of the right-wing military dictatorship.
Closer examination of the foreign journalists working in Argentina, officials' statements, and
activists' claims serve as crucial sources to this argument. This section of the paper contrasts the
press censorship in Argentina and the propaganda surrounding the games with the propaganda
efforts of the international boycott. Additionally, the paper will argue that this said juxtaposition
in opinion and propaganda successfully brought global attention to the crimes of the Junta.
In order to host a successful tournament in the first place, it necessitates a certain amount
of fanfare and excitement leading up to it. In other words, the Junta needed to organize the
tournament both in terms of physical preparations and general perception. This goal, of course,
had to be done without their crimes against humanity being recognized by too many. Thus, the
regime needed to cleanse its image to host an international tournament of this size and grandeur.
The Junta portrayed this attempt to change its image abroad as a campaign against those who
wanted to lie and unfairly destroy Argentina's prestige. 14 In other words, the regime took any
inference or suggestion of wrongdoing as an excuse to claim fabrication from those criticizing
the human rights violations. Such contrasting forms of the truth before the tournament led to a

B.L Smith, "The Argentinian Junta and the Press in the run-up to the 1978 World Cup,” Soccer and
Society 3, no, 1 (2002), https://doi.org/10.1080/714004869, 73-74
14
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massive propaganda battle that would bring never before seen international attention to the
country's human rights issues.
In the lead-up to the tournament, the crimes of the Junta were laid bare outside of
Argentina, in both the world of politics and also that of sport. For instance, in an article by John
Clarke titled Political Football written right after the tournament kicked off, he lays out the
context of the political disappearances. He states, “There are an estimated 8,000 political
prisoners. Another 8,000 are thought to have been killed by government agents. Some 15-30,000
are ‘missing’ (in military hands). There are scores of concentration camps and torture centers.” 15
This statistic was one of the first aspects he detailed in his article, thus pointing out the inherent
ties between the missing political persons at the hands of the regime and their preparation for the
World Cup. The staggering part about these numbers and statistics is that they were accounted
for only a couple of years into the regime's reign. In other words, the horror that was detailed
was just the beginning of what was about to come. Clark then describes Videla's desperate and
incessant need to cover up this said horror. He states, "…the most expensive publicity stunt ever
put on by a third world country and included a princely $1 million-dollar contract for a top New
York public relations firm. General Videla, Argentina's head of state is highly publicity
conscious: 'If it necessary to correct Argentina's image abroad, the '78 World Cup will be just the
occasion to show our real way life' he said before the match." 16 Thus, with quotes such as this
given by Videla, it was clear that the Junta intended to wield the tournament in a manner to
which the regime’s image came off in a positive light. In addition to this blatant admittance from
Videla, the aid of a significant U.S public relations firm only adds to the speculation that those in
John Clarke, "Political Football," New Internationalist, 07, 1978, 27, https://login.ezproxyeres.up.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu/magazines/politicalfootball/docview/1792717239/se-2?accountid=14703, accessed September 1, 2021.
16
John Clarke, "Political Football," New Internationalist, 07, 1978, 27
15
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the United States and other major nations barely cared about the crimes and the political
disappearances taking place.

17

This detail also points to the complacency and eventual support

from the U.S government towards the military Junta. 18 In fact, Henry Kissinger's visit to the
country before the tournament as a representative of the United States epitomized this said
support. A statement such as this did indeed put the regime in a positive light, which they would
utilize to significantly affect their press, as will be discussed later in the paper. 19
However, to dispel any rumors or reports of political opponents being killed or going
missing, the Junta had to quickly subjugate and suppress any domestic forms of media that even
hinted at such. Thus, from the moment the Junta took power and these political disappearances
took place, the dictatorship instituted a brutal and swift form of journalistic suppression in
Argentina. B.L Smith describes accounts of those working in the press during the lead up of the
tournament:
In a memo that contained no identifying letterhead or signature, the government
informed newspapers that: ‘As from today, 22/4/76, it is forbidden to inform,
comment or make reference to subjects related to subversive incidents, the
appearance of bodies and the death of subversive elements and/or of members of
the armed and security forces in these incidents unless a responsible official
source reports them. This includes victims of kidnappings and missing persons.’ 20
Thus, with this memo in mind and its early timing, it was abundantly clear from the start that the
primary goal of the Junta was to suppress their political opposition and simultaneously quell any
reports of them violently doing so. Therefore, from the outset of their military coup, it can be
inferred that the regime viewed its survival based on the public's perception. This notion was
initially the case regarding their domestic perception and later their international one leading up
John Clarke, "Political Football," New Internationalist, 07, 1978, 27
Channel 4 News. “Henry Kissinger and Football's Longest Unsolved Riddle.” YouTube. Channel 4
News, April 5, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flhz4uQF22s&ab_channel=Channel4News.
19
“Argentina Finalista,” Clarín, June 22, 1978, https://tapas.clarin.com/tapa.html#19780622
20
B.L, Smith, "The Argentinian Junta and the Press in the run-up to the 1978 World Cup."
17

18
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to the tournament. This increased suppression of the domestic press corps would only intensify
even further come time of the tournament. For the Junta, any international spotlight on their
political executions and systematic torture would, in theory, lead to a direct delegitimization of
the military dictatorship in itself. Robert Cox, who famously worked for the Buenos Aires
Herald, described these aspects at the time in a very telling interview that would expose the
Junta's insistence on controlling the press as well as the lengths to which they would go to
achieve that goal.
For context, Cox was an English journalist within Argentina who had defied the memo
and overall message of the Junta, which later led to him fleeing the country out of fear for his
life. He wanted to avoid the fate of many other journalists who had been executed for doing the
same.

21

As Cox describes his experience in an interview, he states, “He called in all of the

editors there…probably 30-40 journalist…he was telling us you have to behave because the
whole world is watching. He more or less told everyone not to say what was going on and that
you have to paint a perfect picture of Argentina." 22 The comment in which "the whole world is
watching" to the journalists accurately represents Junta's importance on having a clean,
international perception. He then goes on to detail the importance of his paper by stating, "I
believe that everyone knew what was going on. But they were not forced to realize that they
knew what was going on because nothing appeared in the newspapers, apart from the Herald,
which became an important, tiny, English newspaper." 23 This point made by Cox is crucial in
that the regime assumed, and almost successfully so, they could cover up their crimes to an
effective enough extent by simply not allowing anyone to report on them. With no one to
B.L Smith, "The Argentinian Junta and the Press in the run-up to the 1978 World Cup," p 71
Robert Cox-Papelitos, Youtube. Papelitos, 2018.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzY4ITnRghU&t=6s&ab_channel=memoriaabierta.
23
Robert Cox-Papelitos, Youtube. Papelitos, 2018.
21
22
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account for the crimes, many, in turn, could look the other way. Additionally, this interview
shows the importance of Cox's position and what he could do with the Herald and subsequently
defy the Junta. Nevertheless, this testimony stands out in this regard because what he did was an
outlier when examining the entire Argentine press corps as a whole.
However, the propaganda strategy of journalistic suppression did not stop there for the
Junta. Videla and his ministers even attempted to do the same with the international media.
Smith again describes the paranoid lengths to which the Junta went to keep their image spotless:
Just a week before the World Cup began, the Argentinian Interior Minister
warned the international press covering the Mundial that they must 'be on their
guard against complicity, either voluntary or involuntary, with subversive
elements'…A few journalists, most notably a French reporter who arrived in
Argentina with left-wing publications critical of Argentina in his suitcase, fell
victim to the Junta's threat. He was detained for five hours before being released
after protests from the French ambassador. 24
This action taken by the Junta encapsulates how they desperately wanted to stamp out any form
of negative press, both foreign and domestic. The lengths to which the Junta even went out of
their way to illegally detain a foreign correspondent are prime examples of this said desperation.
However, this strategy would evidently backfire, as the detainment of a foreign journalist only
exposed the Junta's suppression of the press but also subsequently their political crimes. In
addition to this strategy of suppression, both in foreign and domestic media alike, the Junta
consistently labeled any form of criticism towards the regime’s human rights record as
“subversive” actions or “leftist plots against the regime.” 25This framing tactic was meant to
dispel the validity of any form of criticism if it indeed got out. Furthermore, suppose this said
backlash did get released. In that case, because of the Junta's right-wing ideology and the

24
25

B.L, Smith, "The Argentinian Junta and the Press in the run-up to the 1978 World Cup," p.74-45.
Ibid. 73.
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suppression of leftist activists, the Junta easily frames these forms of condemnation in this kind
of political manner, thus taking away their potential authenticity.
Additionally, through suppression of both foreign in domestic journalism, the impact of
the regime’s propaganda strategy was also evident through visuals such as symbolic photographs
shared throughout the country. This aspect can be evidently seen when examining newspaper
headlines before and during the tournament, as well as famous pictures from the matches
themselves. The first photograph that is a prime example of the regime using visual messages to
wield its power and cleanse its image abroad is Jorge Videla's victory against Peru. As seen on
the left, this picture was taken by one of the more famous
sporting media outlets, El Grafico. Ironically enough,
organizations such as FIFA, the DFB, and other commercial
groups defended the tournament being hosted in Argentina
because of the supposed lack of connection between football and
politics. 26 However, this photo demonstrates that the argument is anything but the case. As El
Grafíco was especially sports-focused, 27 The decision to include Videla celebrating in this
joyous manner was quite one that went out of its way to be both strategic and political. Videla is
wearing regular, everyday clothes, which contradicts the usual military uniform he would
consistently wear. But instead, with him wearing the clothes he is wearing, sitting in the middle
of the crowd, and cheering joyously along with everyone else, it is clear that this photo is making
Videla seem like a man of the people rather than a reactionary, ruthless military dictator.

Felix A, Jiménez Botta, “'Yes to Football, No to Torture!' The Politics of the 1978 Football World Cup
in West Germany,” Sport in Society 20, no, 10 (2017): p 1442,
https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2016.1221053.
27
Fabian, Mauri, “Soulful and Soulless: The Amazing Story behind the Two Most Representative
Photographs of Argentina's 1978 World Cup,” COPA90, March 16, 2016.
26
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In addition to sporting photos used to enhance the regime's image, the same could be said
about newspaper headlines as well. One of the more famous newspapers in the Buenos Aries
area, and thus Argentina as a whole, Clarín, represents this need for the regime to desperately
and blatantly clean its image through headline stories. This paper is a perfect example of the
juxtaposition of the tournament as a whole, as well as the
Argentinian press being coerced into defending the regime despite
pressure from the outside. On the top of the headline, which can be
seen to the right, there are reassurances by the military regime not
being involved and not being involved in the future of rumored
political kidnappings. 28 In direct contrast, on the bottom of the page,
the headline and pictures along with it detail the national team
meeting with Jorge Videla, the dictator directly responsible for the kidnappings of the Junta. In
that specific picture, Videla and the players are seen smiling as if to give off a festive look in the
lead-up to the tournament. 29 It seems as if all the reactions in the photo, along with the timing of
the headline's release, seem like an innate response to the pressures of the boycott and the
international spotlight exposing the human rights abuses. Thus, this fact shows that the regime
still went out of its way to respond to the accusations openly but still managed to cleanse its
image in a more positive and innocent light despite what the context entailed.
Lastly, in addition to challenging both foreign and domestic media industries, the military
Junta also went out of its way to assert a stranglehold over soccer journalism as well. Although,
on the surface, this subcategory of reporting may not seem like a crucial institution, it still carried

“Los militares no daremos más saltos al vacío,” Clarín, May 27, 1978,
https://tapas.clarin.com/tapa.html#19780527, translated by Fabi Zeller
29
Ibid, 1
28
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a vital role in covering up the horrible truth about the regime's brutal political executions and
disappearances. This theme was especially the case with Argentina's most famous soccer
magazine El Grafíco. The cultural and social pull of the soccer journal was immense in
Argentina. 30 To this day, the most sold copy of the magazine was the one featuring Argentina’s
victory in 1978, which included pictures of the regime in a positive light and no mention of the
human rights abuses whatsoever. Their editor in chief at the time realized this and stated as such
later in an interview:
Ernesto Cherquis Bialo, at that time chief editor of the most important sports
magazine in the country, admits that 'El Gráfico influenced all the country's
political, social, and economic decisions. ‘It was not just another magazine. The
influence of the magazine was huge, and we knew it. Moreover, El Gráfico made
a lot of effort for Argentina to be the host of the World Cup.’ 31
There, the chief editor of the magazine himself understood the weight of their magazine, and
they were willing to ignore such human rights abuse for the sake of hosting the World Cup.
Thus, with this specific top-down approach to the political climate at the time, it was clear that
the Junta’s intimidation tactics of the domestic press were, to an extent, working. Additionally,
with this attitude in mind, along with the fact that the most sold copy of the magazine came that
last summer in 1978, it was clear that domestic football journalism in Argentina prioritized
profits over honesty. Although the international activist campaigns were more successful in
spreading information, the regime still did an adequate job of hindering their domestic media
from painting a picture of the country that could not be further from the truth.

Fabian, Mauri, “Soulful and Soulless: The Amazing Story behind the Two Most Representative
Photographs of Argentina's 1978 World Cup,” COPA90
31
Mariano, Verrina, “The Coach of the 78 Argentina National Team Menotti: ‘I Kept My Word, I Did
What I Had to Do’” Papelitos. Accessed September 2021. http://papelitos.com.ar/nota/el-dt-de-laseleccion-argentina-en-el-mundial-78.
30
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However, on the flip side of the Argentinian regime's domestic propaganda strategy,
there had been an organized, although not significant, international boycott campaign. This
campaign was accomplished by numerous groups that all held the same goal, exposing the
regime and their crimes to the entire world before the tournament. Groups such as exiled
Argentinians within the country itself, foreign journalists, and Amnesty International all held this
aim. However, each group went about their aim a bit differently from one another. One of the
underground domestic resistance groups within Argentina, the "Montoneros," would discreetly
send pamphlets throughout Buenos Aires renouncing the regime and its crimes. A source that
greatly aided the collection of the forms of domestic resistance is the Papelitos project. Through
first-hand testimonies, this project was meant to serve as a form of honoring different memories
of Argentinians during the tournament. As translated by the Papelitos project, one of the
pamphlets read, "The 78 World Cup is an aspiration of the people and we the Montoneros want it
to be carried out. The dictatorship intends to use it to tell the world "nothing happened here," but
there are trade-unions intervened, the syndical conquests were nullified, there are thousands of
prisoners and kidnapped people, the dictatorship is repressing with ferocity and murders
mercilessly."

32

Commitments and actions such as these were even consistently made at the

individual level. One exiled Argentinean, Luis Bruschtein, also sent letters and pamphlets from
abroad denouncing the regime for its crimes. This strategy, as well, was done leading up to the
tournament in an attempt to slow the country’s hosting process. 33
Although the domestic resistance to the regime's propaganda and its hosting of the World
Cup only had a minimal impact on the local level, the accompanying international-led boycott
Nicolás, Sagaian, “Montoneros’ Pamphlets during the 78 World Cup; The Silent Resistance,” Papelitos,
http://papelitos.com.ar/nota/los-panfletos-de-montoneros-durante-el-mundial-78.
33
Ailín, Bullentini. “Exiled People in the 78 World Cup 100 Letters per Day against the Dictatorship”
Papelitos, http://papelitos.com.ar/nota/exiliados-en-el-mundial-78.
32
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was much broader in scale and far more successful in its goals. Initially, however, the goals set
out by West-German activist groups and Amnesty International seem as if they were going to be
defeated outright. Originally, these same groups wanted to have an outright boycott of the entire
tournament in itself. This goal would have included players and teams refusing to participate,
commercial sponsorships pulling their financial support for the tournament, and thus a
diminished reputation for the tournament as a whole. However, this original set of goals soon
faced a harsh reality. The World Cup and its draw were too hard to defeat in sporting and
financial terms. For FIFA and its numerous and massive commercial sponsors, the notion of
canceling the tournament seemed ridiculous from their respective financial perspectives. On the
flip side, the World Cup is seen as the pinnacle of footballing careers for many players since it
only takes place every four years.
Simply put, the almost mythical allure surrounding the concept of the World Cup was too
good of an opportunity for players, coaches, and teams to pass up. This fact was evident through
the actions of both players and commercial groups in Europe. In response to the pressure of
Amnesty International, many players did indeed consider boycotting. However, their careers
depended on the tournament, and thus inclined to stay and play:
As word of the oppressive Videlan regime spread abroad, various European
countries were put under pressure by Amnesty International and other groups to
boycott the World Cup. Paolo Rossi and Sepp Maier signed petitions against the
torture of political prisoners, but the European no-show failed to materialize.
Dutch star Johnny Rep recalls, 'Many players were aware of what was happening
in Argentina but in the end, I suppose the lure of the World Cup was simply too
strong.' Only West German defender Paul Breitner refused to travel on political
grounds, although Sweden's Ronnie Hellström would later protest alongside the
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. 34

34

John, Spurling, Death or Glory: The Dark History of the World Cup, Quotes cited by Spurling: p 98.
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In addition to the dissolution of players' and teams' boycotting, Spurling again details, "Ezequiel
Fernandez Moores…suggests that business interests remained paramount in governments'
decisions to send teams to South America. Amnesty International was vocal in Germany, for
example, but Mercedes-Benz, Siemens, and Telfunken, amongst other companies, stood to lose
millions of Deutschmarks in sponsorship and advertising in the event of a German boycott." 35
Like with FIFA and its sponsors, this fact again further exemplified the pattern of commercial
groups alongside sporting institutions, which prioritized the potential money that came from the
World Cup over the human rights issues as a whole. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation in
terms of the financial and sporting impact of the tournament started to set in for the boycott
groups abroad.
Thus, with this change in the fact that the tournament planned to go on as expected,
Amnesty International and numerous other European activist groups instead shifted strategies to
start a campaign of education and political awareness when discussing the tournament. As B.L
Smith states, “After realizing that urging people away from the Mundial was pointless and might
even create counter-sympathy for the Junta, Amnesty International instead launched a campaign
to educate journalists preparing to cover the World Cup about the Videla regime." 36 This form
of public education led to a step in the right direction to bring some form of justice concerning
the human rights violations at the hands of the regime. For many, the work of the activist groups
internationally was the first instance in which the global community heard of the atrocities or
even the political situation as it currently stood in Argentina. This trend was particularly the case
in many European activist corners, especially the "Yes to Football, No Torture!" movement in
West Germany. Botta reaffirms this viewpoint by stating, "As in these previous campaigns, West
35
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Germans activists, by means of the 'Yes to Football, No to Torture!' campaign, we're able to
make atrocities in Argentina, even if for a fleeting moment, a matter of national debate and
criticize the stance of their government and the DFB. The uniqueness of the campaign lies in the
novel use of culture, in this case sports, for attracting the attention of the average West German
for atrocities in a far-off country."

37

In addition to the wide-scale education about the lead-up to the tournament, the activist
groups also utilized various forms of politically charged forms of visual art
that served to educate and battle the regime's domestic propaganda
campaign. Solely, the three artistic posters detailed were collected and
translated by the Papelitos project. More specifically, two of the posters
come from France's largest boycott group, "COBA," while Amnesty
International released the last one. The first poster (depicted to the right)
portrays a soldier ready to execute a political prisoner while players play on a pitch behind them.
Above the image, there is a phrase the translates to, “When you applaud the eleven of France, the
cheers will drown out the noises of the people they are torturing.”

38

Since this came from a

French source, the message was clear, if you support or even watch the tournament at all, you are
signing off on those who are oppressed and thus covering up the regime’s crimes.
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COBA also took their rhetoric regarding their art a step further. Specifically, they insisted
that boycotting the regime and the subsequent tournament hosted by them is a necessary form of
anti-fascism due to the regime’s right-wing, militaristic ties. Therefore, with the
corrupt political backdrop of political executions and kidnappings being presented
to the world by the activist groups, COBA goes out its way to compare the 1978
tournament to that of the 1936 Berlin Olympics hosted by the Nazis. The poster (as
seen on the left) makes that direct comparison very clear to see, thus insisting on
the need to resist the Argentine regime as if one should resist against the Nazis. 39
Lastly, another prime example of art mixed with propaganda
and used to influence the power of the activist message is seen in the poster to the
right of this paragraph. Here, Amnesty International designed the silhouette of the
ball with barbed wire to represent that political prisoners tortured in concentration
surround the tournament itself. That said system of torture goes hand in hand with
the regime hosting the tournament. 40
Thus, with this powerful combination of art and education, there was a newfound sense
of awareness in the lead-up to the tournament. Not only did this new form of awareness educate
essential areas of the world, but by doing so, it also started to shine a light on the human rights
abuses in Argentina on a never-before-seen scale. As Botta again clarifies, “At the same time, the
World Cup was a setback for the ambitious counteroffensive against an alleged ‘Anti-Argentine
campaign’ that the Junta had envisioned. As Rein (2014) has shown, activists in France, the
Netherlands, Israel, Spain, West Germany, and Sweden were 'successful in promoting a public
debate … on ties with the Argentinean dictatorship, on issues of human rights and international
39
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relations, as well as on the use and abuse of sports for political purposes."

41

This fact was a

significant blow not only to the Argentinean regime's propaganda strategy of minimizing
discussions about the appearances, but it also, in turn, delegitimized their seizure of power and
even their authority as a whole.
Section 2:
Corruption played a significant role in the regime's preparation for the tournament and its
games themselves. As mentioned earlier, soccer fans and historians alike distinctly remember the
Argentinian tournament for its corrupt political backdrop and its corrupt nature in terms of
sporting merit. In hindsight, some in the soccer world question the validity of the victories
themselves due to rumors of match-fixing, political threats, drug use, and more. 42 However, by
contrast, some historians and both soccer fans argue that despite all of these potential
irregularities in and throughout the tournament, the sporting integrity of Argentina's victory still
holds true today. More specifically, soccer historians such as Johnathon Wilson and the players
and coaches of the Argentinian team alike claim that they won in the face of the politically
corrupt backdrop rather than directly because of it. 43 Nonetheless, after closer examination, there
was an apparent influence in the lead-up to the games by the military Junta. However, much of
the direct impact of the Junta's influence is either based on rumor, hearsay, or speculation, thus
not giving enough concrete evidence of the possibility of specific match-fixing. Thus, the only
way to determine the games' legitimacy is to examine the matches. After doing precisely as such,
the argument that the Argentinian national team won in contempt of the Junta rather than
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because of it holds up more than the arguments as mentioned earlier. However, more detail and
context are needed to back up this claim.
Because of the brutal human rights abuses of the regime prior to the tournament, there was an
inherently immense amount of pressure on the Argentina national team by the regime. The
regime needed a victory on home soil in order to sustain power, but also in order to change the
Junta's image domestically and abroad. '"Videla needed to win the World Cup to cleanse
Argentina's bad image around the world,'"

44

The first-hand witnessing of these intimidation

tactics can be found through John Spurling’s Death or Glory. In it, Spurling references Leopoldo
Luque, a player for the Argentinian national team, and his personal experience with the regime
leading up to the tournament:
Luque recalled, 'France and Italy were very highly rated teams, and would do very
well four years later at the 1982 World Cup. After the Hungary match, one of the
military men warned me that this could easily be a 'group of death, as far as you
are concerned.' He said it with a smile on his face, but I had no reason to believe
that he was joking. After all we knew how important the World Cup was for the
Junta. Uppermost in my mind was that the brother of a close friend of mine had
disappeared earlier that day. His body was later found by villagers on the banks of
the River Plate with concrete attached to his legs. At that time opponents of the
regime were sometimes thrown out of planes into the sea.’ 45
When numerous high-quality teams are in the same group, it is often referred to as the "group of
death." In this regard, the play on words made this threat so direct, thus epitomizing the lens
from which both the players and the regime viewed the games. In other words, lives were
potentially on the line, and the games themselves could have had unforeseen consequences for
the players involved. However, although this was a direct threat and influenced the national
team's play, there is still no direct correlation to the regime fixing the games in favor of
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Argentina. In fact, after warnings such as these, one could argue that the players played in the
face of threats made by the regime. By no means did the Junta threatening to kill their own
players fix the game in their favor.
Additionally, as the disappearances at the hands of the regime were common, many
players, including Luque and Tarrantini, as previously mentioned, even personally knew those
who had gone missing. 46 Thus, there was a clear backdrop of human rights abuses of the
tournament for not only the players involved in the tournament itself but also for the general
public as a whole. Of course, the political disappearances were more than just a mere "backdrop"
for the families and loved ones who fell victim to the regime's brutal repression. Despite this
fact, newspaper headlines and front pages still mention the disappearances
and thus the contrasting nature of the tournament itself despite the regime's
best efforts to not even mentioned the kidnappings. Clarín47 that exhibits
this sentiment in the front of the Argentina newspaper. In this source (as
depicted to the left), the page describes Argentina's now considered
controversial win 6-0 over Peru, well, without any controversy. Below the
headline about the match, the newspaper reaffirms that there have been no
human rights abuses by citing Henry Kissinger's meeting with Jorge Videla
the day of the game. Although the accusations of the human rights abuses from the Junta are
casually dismissed in this headline, they still are mentioned in a defensive manner.
In contrast, many soccer historians, such as Andreas Campomar and John Spurling, view the
matches throughout the 1978 tournament in a controversial light. The match that most epitomizes
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this issue is the Argentina 6-0 win over Peru. Due to a different format, going into the match,
Argentina had to win the match by 3 goals, no small feat as Peru were one of the better defensive
teams that tournament. However, they instead shockingly won 6-0, and booked their ticket to the
final. 48 Rumors of match-fixing and Peruvian players being paid off to lose
for the sake of the Argentinian's regime success quickly surfaced. A news
article by Warren Hoge written after the outcome of the match by Warren
Hoge emphasizes how bizarre it was that Argentina won 6-0 against such a
formidable opponent while backing up these claims with other famous
South American players sharing similar sentiments. The piece concludes
with the anger of countries affected by these allegations by stating that Peruvian fans welcomed
back their players at the airport by throwing "spare change at their heads" as an accusation of
corruption and match-fixing. This article shows the genuine initial outrage over such a surprising
victory with the political backdrop that was impossible to ignore. To add fuel to the fire
regarding the potentially corrupt nature of the match, there is evidence that Videla met with Peru
before the match. First, contrary to statements of Videla claiming he never did as such, there is
primary photographic evidence of this infamous encounter as shown to the left here.

49

However,

what was said was not exactly known for sure, but Johnathon Wilson claims that Peruvian
players told them they were “pressured.” As he states in his book Angels With Dirty Faces,
“Even more remarkable are the testimonies of several Peruvian players. ‘Were we pressured?
Yes, we were pressured,’ midfielder José Velásquez told Channel 4. ‘What kind of pressure?
Pressure from the government. From the government to the managers of the team, from the
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managers of the team to the coaches.’” 50 This picture, along with the testimony of the Peruvian
players, such as the one given by José Velásquez above, shows that the regime certainly
pressured the players, both Argentinian and Peruvian alike. Spurling backs up this sentiment by
referencing another Peruvian player. Specifically, he states, "Ledesma claimed that Peru's
military leader Francisco Morales Bermúdez sent thirteen prisoners to Argentina to be tortured
and that Videla accepted them only on the condition that Argentina got the result they
required…' So he only accepted the group if Peru allowed the Argentina national team to
triumph."' 51 This quote once again shows the threatening influence the Junta had on just about
every national team. With this in mind, one thing is clear, the Junta played a major in influencing
players, teams, and thus, matches themselves. Nonetheless, this fact does not necessarily mean
the final six to zero scoreline of the Peru game, nor the games of the entire tournament were set
in stone through forms of concrete match-fixing.
Additionally, the physical matches played out in the aftermath of these allegations do not
exactly reflect the blatantly fixed nature that the players describe. Thus, the highlights from this
game serve as an essential piece of evidence that adds some sense of validity to Argentina’s
victory over Peru. 52 Goals from fixed games tend to be blatant giveaways or erroneous errors
from the team intentionally losing. Usually, this inference would apply to a team that concedes
goals at this kind of rate. However, in five of the six goals throughout the match, none came
from Peruvian errors. On top of that, Peru had dangerous opportunities early on, even hitting the
post in the early minutes. 53 Lastly, all of the goals scored by Argentina were done so out of fluid
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attacking movements and high quality, something that the 1978 team was renowned for
throughout the tournament based on Menotti's (the manager) philosophy of play. 54 Reflecting on
the game, many Argentinian players and coaching staff held this same sentiment that they
deserved to win. This sentiment was shared concerning the controversial Peru game and the
tournament as a whole. Wilson backs up these claims both personally and by citing player
testimony:
Proof of anything untoward, though, is hard to come by, and it’s doubtful that
anybody watching a video of the game without foreknowledge of the suspicions
around it would see anything unusual. Larrosa is dismissive of suggestions the
game was fixed, and, if it were, it’s fair to say either that not all the Peruvians
were in on it or that some of them were exceptionally good actors. Juan Muñante
hit the post early on, while Quiroga made a string of improbable saves. 55
Careful analysis such as this quote and watching the highlights show that Peru's early game
dominance represented anything but a fix. If anything, the quality of the goals scored by
Argentina exemplifies their attacking quality rather than an intentional Peruvian capitulation.
More Argentinian players back up this sentiment by emphasizing the quality of Peru's play in the
initial stages of the game. In Wilson's book, he continues to cite Larrosa by stating, '"They had
two chances in first ten minutes: one hit a post, and another shot from [Juan Carlos] Oblitas was
almost a goal,’ said Larrosa. ‘Those are the details that are forgotten when they say, ‘Oh, it was
6–0. What happened there?’ And if you think about that shot that hit the post, give me the best
player, give me Pelé or Maradona, make him dribble past a defender and hit a post on purpose,
and he won’t be able to do it.’” 56Additionally, the Argentinian national team coach has
repeatedly reinforced the validity of his players' success during the tournament. Mariano Verrina
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interviewed Menotti about this exact topic for the Papelitos research project. Concerning the
hotly debated validity of the matches, Menotti states:
No, surely not. It was a calumny. A miserable infamy of those who later became
revolutionaries and during the 78 World Cup broadcasted the matches with Videla
in their ears. A shame. It is a shame not to recognize everything that those players
did, that they played for free all their lives, that they never claimed a prize. 57
Thus, this interview serves as an excellent source concerning the point of view of the
Argentinian players and coaching staff regarding their tournament triumph. Regarding the
legitimacy of the tournament victory, it is necessary to, at the very least, understand the point of
view and examine the first-hand accounts of those in question. Thus, after the combined
examination of the games themselves and the points of view of both the Argentinian players and
coaches, it is clear that they won the matches in the face of the regime's pressure rather than
solely because of it. Yes, the dictatorship had a tremendous impact on the matches, but the
regime itself did not physically win the matches on the field of play. Now, that is to say,
validating the sporting merit of the nation is not diminishing the crimes and the dark role the
Junta had during this period in time. Instead, validation goes as far as to further celebrate the
victory at hand because of the threats and the physical pressure the team overcame.
Section 3:
Although the Peru game itself and the sporting merit that was needed to win the tournament
is still defended by many players today, the historical and political meaning of the tournament
tells a different story. The memory of the meaning of Argentina’s victory still wildly differs
among casual football fans, the Argentinian players, coaches, historians, and Argentines directly
affected by the Junta. Although the victory may have been viewed as having won outright and
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fairly, the everlasting impact immediately after the tournament and decades later is still a crucial
aspect of modern Argentinian history. Thus, although the Junta and the Argentine team
themselves had the same end goal in mind with regards to the outcome of the tournament, the
reasoning for wanting the tournament victory could not have been more different. Many players,
including the coach himself, Menotti, could not have been more against the regime.
The common theme was that the games were being played by the team "for the people." 58
This idea was, of course, the inherent motivation for many players and the coach regarding
winning the tournament. Again, as the national team Menotti coach defends the World Cup
victory, he states, “Menotti was clearly uncomfortable with the nationalist rhetoric that
surrounded the team and sought to dispel the notion that his side was somehow representative of
the government. ‘Playing we did not defend our borders, the motherland, the flag,’ he insisted in
1977. ‘With the national team nothing essentially patriotic dies or is saved.’ He saw himself
playing less for the nation than for the great traditions of Argentinian soccer, through which the
spirit of the people was tenuously expressed.”’ 59 However, this mindset even spilled over into
even in terms of the way the team played. This mindset was laid bare to see with more interviews
with the additional team coach Menotti. He instilled this mindset from the start of the
tournament. According to Johnathon Wilson, “What should he have done, Menotti asked, ‘to
coach teams that played badly, that based everything on tricks, that betrayed the feelings of the
people? No, of course not.’ Instead, he argued, his soccer, being free and creative, offered a
reminder of the free, creative Argentina that existed before the Junta.” 60 Both Wilson and
Spurling describe how this style of play, described as fluid attacking-minded football, was a form
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of protest to the regime and the establishment of Argentinian football as a whole. Previously, like
with those of the regime, the style of play was very physical, defensive, and anything but
technical. Menotti went to great lengths to break this notion of playing by refusing to call up
some of the better players from previous tournaments and club teams within Argentina. 61 Here,
Menotti explaining the significance of the style of play shows that from the outset of the
tournament, if the team were going to win, it would do so in a way that symbolically defied the
regime.
Specifically, a form of defiance was what the players were openly playing for. As a result
of the aforementioned attitude deeply embedded into the team going into the tournament, many
players have viewed their victory as one achieved solely "for the people." Many players secretly
held animosity towards the Junta, but some even openly spoke out against it in symbolic
gestures. The underlying animosity towards the regime becomes apparent when examining
players' responses to winning the final in front of the Junta. As Spurling details in his interview
with Galván, "Several of the victorious Argentine players, including Galván, refused to shake
Videla's hand. 'It would have destroyed the experience, and I wanted nothing to do with the
Junta. All I wanted to do was touch the trophy and celebrate with the fans.’” 62 Thus, in cases
such as these, players felt and knew their responsibility with winning the tournament. Many on
the team knew how it positively impacted the regime but went out of their way to accredit their
success in the tournament and still not celebrate directly with the Junta, thus connecting their
World cup victory directly to the Junta itself.
This viewpoint goes hand in with the idea that the World Cup victory does solely go hand
in hand with the Junta, but rather, the victory was a sign of resistance towards it. When
61
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examining the victory 40 years later, Lívia Magalhães states, “A second dominant memory took
shape: this was a new interpretation of the authoritarian period in which society appears no
longer as a victim but as a source of resistance. In this interpretation, victory celebrations in the
field are understood as positive manifestations of determination."

63

This sense of resistance

towards the regime because of the national team's victory is evident beyond solely examining the
reactions of the players and coach. Even those whom the Junta persecuted saw the popular
celebrations as a turning point. As Claudio Tamburrini left to go celebrate in the city, despite
being in hiding months prior to avoid political persecution, he states, "That night in late June
1978, I felt that I was again a full citizen of my country and of the world. I also celebrated,
convinced, the victory of the national team. And I felt that all of us, together, had now started the
path towards the end.” 64 Experiences such as these are essential to uphold and share because of
their contradictory nature compared to the reality of someone's situation. In other words, if
someone whose life had been turned upside down by the Junta can see hope in this kind of
situation, it says a lot about the ability of many Argentinians to separate the regime with the
success of the national team. However, as the paper will describe in later detail, experiences and
points of view such as these come few and far between many everyday Argentinians.
However, the memory of the people not playing in the tournament is not so simple and
more complex when examining other people’s testimonies. Not everyone viewed the victory as
one done for the people; instead, many who were bitter about Argentina's victory grouped the
players with the regime, or at the very least, felt immensely conflicted. When examining the
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victory over the last forty years, historians such as Lívia Magalhães have taken a taken view on
whether the players effectively stood up to the regime or not. Shortly after the Junta fell, a
dominant theme arose. Specifically, as Magalhães states, “There are two main dominant
memories in recent Argentine history in relation to the 1978 World Cup. The first, that of the
previously mentioned 'Dictatorship Cup,' which emerged during the final years of the regime and
gained strength during the transition to democracy: it is the idea that victory in the field was also
a victory for the government. According to this point of view, players, technical commissions,
and others involved on the field were seen as collaborators or supporters of the dictatorship.” 65
This belief was widely shared by those most negatively impacted by the regime. This attitude
ranged from many aforementioned groups impacted by the regime leading up to and during the
World Cup. Specifically, as Spurling noted, one of the leaders of the “Mothers of the
Disappeared” states, "I'd seen Videla's face in the dignitaries' section and immediately, for me,
the final was tarnished," she explains. 'It was wonderful to see Argentine men playing so well on
a world stage, but for me, it was a beautiful but dirty World Cup.'" 66 This experience alone
shows that with the simplest notion of the Junta even being somewhat connected to the victory,
the tournament will forever have been tainted. For someone's entire experience around the
victory to have been ruined just by seeing the face of Videla at the match, it shows the extent to
which the Junta's crimes were deeply embedded in Argentinian society.
Nevertheless, crucial testimony asks Argentinians who knew loved ones kidnapped by
the Junta and those who were political prisoners. Many knew the inherent bias that a successful
tournament could have meant for the Junta before the tournament even started. Garcia Daleo
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explains this shared opinion among political prisoners while locked up in a political prison camp
not far from the stadium: “We talked about the ‘78 World Cup. We knew the dates. We knew
about some organizations abroad, and even some of the national teams had discussed whether or
not to boycott the World Cup. It was a controversial issue: the opposition to the boycott was
based on the fact that football was a popular passion that was impossible to ignore…Those in
favor argued that it was necessary to prevent the dictatorship from taking advantage of the
Championship to project a false positive notion. It was a similar situation to what happened when
talking about the Olympics during Nazism…The truth was hard to take: 'If they won, we lost '…
That was solitude: knowing that, if I shouted that I was a disappeared, no one was going to give a
crap."

67

This experience shows that in hindsight, some of the regime's victims have recognized

the irreversible politically corrupt nature of the tournament; yet, political prisoners still viewed
those said celebrations as a form of unforgiving betrayal.
However, the cries from the victims of the Junta, both literally and figuratively, went
unheard during the matches. In the wild celebrations of victory, everyone for a moment forgot
about those who had disappeared. This aspect of the tournament always has been a victory for
the Junta and their need for a more prestigious image. Manuel Kalmes shares this point of view
in Spurling's book. Specifically, Kalmes describes his limited and even forced celebration of the
team's victory in the final after being periodically released from his jail cell. He describes his
experience by stating, “You could hear fireworks going off all around. When we got in the car
there was another guard in there waiting for us. He had a gun. ‘We are going out to celebrate,’
they explained. ‘But if you try to run we'll put a bullet in you. With all the fireworks no one will
notice '… I was aggrieved that Menotti and the players, or the press, didn't speak out against
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Videla, because they must have known. I still believe that. Like in Nazi Germany, many people
were complicit in what happened, but during the World Cup, they submerged their feelings and
pretended it wasn't happening. I didn't say anything that night, or try to run: I just soaked up the
whole experience. The thing was that no one would have wanted to listen if I'd told them
anyway. That night, fellow Argentines would have thought I was mad. And that was the greatest
madness of all."

68

Thus, the extent to which the players "won for the people" and symbolically

resisted the regime made no fundamentally meaningful impact during the tournament. The
reality of the situation had not changed, the national team won, and thus, the Junta got what they
so dearly wanted. Jiménez Botta argues that this victory, which led to a crucial moment of
nationalistic celebrations across the country, enabled the regime to stay in power for a few years
longer.
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Thus, it is clear that the memory of the victory by the national team, and the patriotic

celebrations that came with it, will forever be connected with the Junta.
Conclusion
The 1978 World Cup is quite complicated in its controversy. However, after further
examination of first-hand accounts of the political corruption and the human rights abuses
before, during, and after the tournament, three aspects of 1978 are apparent. First, the military
Junta went out of its way to try its best to cover up its crimes against humanity both domestically
and abroad through a brutal and unforgiving censorship strategy. However, due to the internal
pressure leading up to the tournament, they failed. Although the boycott attempt of the
competition did not lead to any teams pulling out or cancellation of the World Cup, it still led to
an unprecedented amount of attention upon the regime and its crimes that are still vividly
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remembered and memorialized today. Second, the Junta influenced the teams throughout the
tournament through threats of violence. However, this form of influence was not enough to rig
the matches entirely and utterly favor Argentina. If anything, the Argentinian national team
achieved victory through perseverance against the Junta's influence in the face of these threats.
Third, although the Argentinian team symbolically protested the regime numerous ways, its
victory still aided the regime and accomplished its goals.
Doing so tarnished the experiences and the victimhood of those negatively affected by
the regime because the victory propelled the regime to further stay in power. With the regime's
power now sustained for a greater length of time after the World Cup, the political victims of the
regime continued to suffer horribly. As Archetti states, “The World Cup turned out to be a
success in a ‘pacified’ society. The wave of popular nationalism was extreme. The
demonstrations of joy in the stadiums and the streets after the Argentine victories that culminated
in the triumph against Holland in the final were interpreted by the Junta as the success of a
national project.” 70 This fact is too hard to ignore. Thus, although the boycott was successful due
to its education, and the team players still won on their sporting merit, the regime still got what
they so desperately wanted, a World Cup victory on home soil. This victory for the regime
sustained their time in charge of the country and showed how powerful football could be
concerning politics and power.
Although the details of the 1978 World Cup and how it is remembered may seem tedious
to some, the examination of the tournament's memory is crucial in understanding the infusion of
soccer with the politics of the regime. This said, a closer examination allows us to look deeper
into critical sporting events that may seem innocent at the surface level but negatively impact
Alan, Tomlinson, and Christopher Young, National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture,
Politics, and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup, 137.
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thousands of people and serve as a political purpose for states around the world. It is also
important to remember the crimes against the Junta in the run-up of this World Cup when
examining future ones. Lessons need to be learned from 1978 to better understand and form of
protest against states that host tournaments with human rights abuse. Unfortunately, this topic is
still incredibly relevant today regarding the upcoming 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Specifically,
Qatar has been using migrant slave labor to build stadiums and entire cities, even for the
upcoming tournament. 71 This system of migrant slavery has already cost upwards of thousands
of lives, and some national teams are already protesting the tournament. 72 With this aspect
included with both the 1978 and the 2022 tournaments, it is clear that there are inherent
underlying political and human rights ties with the World Cup. Whether there is action or
inaction from teams, commercial sponsors, and fans in situations such as these could either stop
human rights abuses such of this manner or inversely thoroughly validate them with inaction.
However, this potential for political change in these politically charged sporting events comes
down to all actors involved, including us. Thus, it is essential to remember the lessons of those
who called for the 1978 World Cup boycott and do the same for 2022 in Qatar. If those same
lessons are not learned, then many years down the road, the international community will be
asking themselves the same question: how could we let this happen?

“Qatar World Cup of Shame,” Amnesty International, July 29, 2021,
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